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ARTICLES
BANKRUPTCY LAW
The Honorable Kevin R. Huennekens *
Nathan Kramer **
INTRODUCTION
This survey of bankruptcy and insolvency case law is the third
installment in this series, which was initiated in 2009' following
Congress's enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") in 2005.2 The previous ver-
sion of this article was published in 2012,' not long after the Su-
preme Court's 2011 ruling in Stern v. Marshall, which restricted
the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on is-
sues arising under state law.4 As was noted in the 2012 install-
ment, "[t]he full impact of Stern both nationally and in the Fourth
Circuit remains to be seen."' There has been a significant amount
of development concerning Stern claims both nationally and with-
* Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond,
Virginia. J.D., 1978, Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William & Mary;
B.A., 1975, College of William & Mary.
** Associate, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2014, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2011, Marywood University. Former Law Clerk to the
Honorable Kevin R. Huennekens, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, 2014-15.
1. Hon. Douglas 0. Tice, Jr., Suzanne E. Wade & K. Elizabeth Sieg, Annual Survey
of Virginia Law: Bankruptcy Law, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 201 (2009).
2. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.).
3. Hon. Douglas 0. Tice, Jr., K. Elizabeth Sieg & David W. Gaffey, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Bankruptcy Law, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 51 (2012).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
5. Tice, Sieg & Gaffey, supra note 3, at 51.
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in the Fourth Circuit in the past three years.6 It is fitting that
this installment should come on the heels of the Supreme Court's
decision in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which
has resolved many of the issues posed by Stern, at least for the
time being.7 More generally, the Supreme Court has decided an
abnormally large number of bankruptcy cases in the past few
years.
This article will cover both consumer and business bankruptcy
issues, and is limited primarily to decisions by courts within the
Fourth Circuit since mid-2012. Despite these general parameters,
because bankruptcy is federal law, there are some cases outside
the Fourth Circuit that are included due to their influential and
instructive nature. The intention of this update is to provide
bankruptcy practitioners in Virginia with concise, yet compre-
hensive, case summaries that will prove to be a valuable research
tool.
This article begins with a discussion of the Stern developments
over the past three years, and how Wellness has resolved many of
the questions posed by Stern. Next, the article provides summar-
ies of cases within a number of different topic areas, including:
property of the estate, the automatic stay, asset sales, discharge,
avoidance powers, standing, and issues related to plan confirma-
tion and res judicata.
I. STERN AND WELLNESS
In 2011, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
the structure of the bankruptcy judiciary for the first time in thir-
ty years.8 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
6. "'Stern claims' are those claims designated core claims by the Bankruptcy Statute,
but prohibited from final resolution by bankruptcy courts as a constitutional matter by
Stern." Shaunna D. Jones & Paul V. Shalhoub, Supreme Court Provides Guidance to
Bankruptcy Courts in Addressing 'Stern Claims" and Holds That 'Stern Claims" May
Proceed as Non-Core Claims, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 2 (June 18, 2014), http://
www.willkie.coml-/media/Files/Publications/2014/06/Supreme-CourtProvidesGuidance_
toBankruptcyCourts inAddressingSternClaims.pdf.
7. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
8. Stern has received a plethora of scholarly attention since it was decided. Because
of this wealth of existing analysis, this article presents only a brief discussion of Stern's
actual holding. For greater discussion of Stern's background, see Katie Drell Grissel, Stern
v. Marshall-Digging for Gold and Shaking the Foundation of Bankruptcy Courts (or Not),
72 LA. L. REV. 647, 648 (2012).
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Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., which held that
the power granted to bankruptcy courts by the Bankruptcy Act of
1978 violated Article III of the Constitution,9 Congress enacted
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
(the "1984 Act") in an attempt to comply with the Marathon deci-
sion." Essentially, the 1984 Act altered the manner in which
judges were named and how higher federal courts reviewed the
rulings of the bankruptcy courts." Despite these changes, Stern
ultimately determined that the 1984 Act still violated Article III
by giving bankruptcy courts the final authority to decide claims
based solely on state law. 2 The Court based its decision on sepa-
ration-of-powers principles, finding that because bankruptcy
judges are not Article III judges, and as the Constitution "pro-
vides that the judicial power of the United States may be vested
only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that
Article," Congress exceeded this limitation in the 1984 Act by al-
lowing non-Article III judges to decide issues exclusively based on
state law.'
3
Following Stern, there was a great deal of uncertainty at the
bankruptcy, district, and circuit court levels regarding how to
comply with the Supreme Court's decision. " Ultimately, one pri-
mary way of coping with Stern emerged in the lower courts-
consent.
For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia addressed this issue in Corliss Moore & As-
sociates, LLC v. Credit Control Services, Inc." In Corliss, the liq-
uidating trustee under the debtors' Chapter 11 plan brought an
adversary proceeding against a company that the debtor retained
pre-confirmation, seeking collection of customer accounts and al-
leging breach of contract and indemnification against a subcon-
9. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
10. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28
u.s.c.).
11. See Med. Educ. & Health Servs., Inc. v. Indep. Municipality of Mayaguez (In re
Med. Educ. & Health Servs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 527, 548 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011).
12. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
13. Id. at 2620.
14. See, e.g., Tice, Sieg & Gaffey, supra note 3, at 92 ("Bankruptcy, district, and circuit
courts continue to grapple with Stern's impact, and clear consensus on Stern's reach has
not yet emerged.").
15. 497 B.R. 219 (E.D. Va. 2013).
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tractor of the company."6 After the parties engaged in unsuccess-
ful mediation, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and sought
discovery from the liquidating trustee, at which point the compa-
ny sought to withdraw the district court's reference to the bank-
ruptcy court.7 Ultimately, Judge Spencer held that the defendant
company had impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court's juris-
diction over this non-core matter by entering into a post-petition
contract with the debtors and by filing motions and seeking dis-
covery.6 Therefore, withdrawal of the reference was not warrant-
ed.19 Thus, post-Stern, within the Eastern District of Virginia,
bankruptcy courts continued to issue final decisions on Stern
claims, so long as each party consented.
In the summer of 2014, the Supreme Court shed additional
light on its Stern decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency
v. Arkison, where it held that bankruptcy courts could rule on
core Stern claims so long as the court treated the claim as a non-
core claim and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law that the district court would review de novo.2° Despite
this holding, the Court still left unanswered whether bankruptcy
courts could issue final decisions on Stern claims with the consent
of both parties. It was not until late May 2015 that the Supreme
Court finally addressed this issue.
The facts of Wellness are relatively intricate, but can be sum-
marized as follows. Following the entry of a judgment in excess of
$650,000 in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas against defendant Sharif for discovery abuses,
Sharif was arrested and held in civil contempt.21 Upon his release,
Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Northern District of
Illinois. 2 The judgment creditor, Wellness International Network,
Ltd. promptly filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
court.3 The first four counts of Wellness's complaint sought o ob-
16. Id. at 222.
17. Id. at 222-23.
18. Id. at 228-29.
19. Id. at 229.
20. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2014).
21. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2013).
22. Id. at 754.
23. Id. at 757.
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ject to the debtor's discharge under Bankruptcy Code § 727.24 The
fifth count of the complaint sought a declaration that a trust, of
which the debtor was the trustee, was in fact the debtor's alter
ego and that the assets of the trust should be treated as part of
the bankruptcy estate.25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to
enter a final judgment on count five because the alter ego claim
was a state law claim entirely independent of federal bankruptcy
law.26 The court further held that a litigant cannot waive an Arti-
cle III, constitutional objection to the bankruptcy court's authori-
ty to enter a final judgment on a core proceeding.27 Previously, the
Ninth Circuit held in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.,
that litigants may consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction,2"
while the Sixth Circuit held in Waldman v. Stone that Stern ob-
jections cannot be waived.29 Because of this circuit split, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Wellness to answer whether
Article III permits the exercise of judicial power by the bankrupt-
cy court on the basis of litigant consent."
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled, in a 6-3 decision au-
thored by Justice Sotomayor, to which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, that Article III permits
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate Stern claims based on the par-
ties' consent." The Court relied on language from Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission v. Schor, which held that "[t]he enti-
tlement to an Article III adjudicator is 'a personal right' and thus
ordinarily 'subject to waiver."'2 The crux of the Court's analysis is
essentially that "allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims
submitted to them by consent does not offend the separation of
powers so long as Article III courts retain supervisory authority
24. Id. All further references to the Bankruptcy Code are to the Bankruptcy Code as
codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 775-76.
27. Id. at 773.
28. 702 F.3d 553, 566-70 (9th Cir. 2012).
29. 698 F.3d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2012).
30. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942, 1944 (2015).
31. Id. at 1944-45.
32. Id. at 1944 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
848 (1986)).
20151
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over the process."33 The Court placed emphasis on the practical
effects of finding the bankruptcy judicial system unconstitutional,
noting that whether the integrity of the judicial branch is threat-
ened is "decided not by 'formalistic and unbending rules,' but
'with an eye to the practical effect that the' practice 'will have on
the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary."'34 The
Court then proceeded to hold that allowing parties to consent to
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction does not threaten the integrity
of Article III because bankruptcy judges are subject to removal by
Article III judges, serve as officers of the district court, constitute
a unit of the district court, and hear matters solely as a result of
the district court's reference, which it may revoke sua sponte or
by request of any party.35
The practical considerations of the Supreme Court holding oth-
erwise would likely have been substantial. A contrary ruling
would have had the potential to unsettle the entire bankruptcy
judicial system, disrupt the utilization of magistrate judges, and
require district court judges to adjudicate an extremely large
number of matters currently handled by other courts. Such a de-
cision, however, would not have been entirely shocking, as the
Supreme Court has not been reluctant to shake up the bankrupt-
cy system in the past, for example as it did in Marathon.36
The Court in Wellness noted that consent does not need to be
express.37 In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, the pretrial orders of most of the judges con-
tain language providing that any party that does not consent to
the entry of a final order by the bankruptcy judge must make a
motion to withdraw the reference or request other appropriate re-
lief within thirty days of the entry of the pretrial order, or the
33. Id. at 1944.
34. Id. (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851).
35. Id. at 1944-45.
36. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
37. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1947 ("Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to
adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express. Nor does the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. §
157, mandate express consent; it states only that a bankruptcy court must obtain 'the con-
sent'-consent simpliciter-'of all parties to the proceeding' before hearing and determin-
ing a non-core claim.").
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party is deemed to have consented to the entry of final orders by
the bankruptcy judge."
In the previous installment of this article, the authors noted
that they believed "most matters of bankruptcy administration
will continue to be carried out by the bankruptcy courts with lit-
tle impact from Stern."39 Following Wellness, it appears that this
prediction will likely remain accurate. Although, any practition-
ers that do not wish to have a Stern claim adjudicated by the
bankruptcy court must be cautious not to take action in the bank-
ruptcy court that will rise to the level of implied consent.
II. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
There have been a number of noteworthy cases related to prop-
erty of the estate that have been decided by the Supreme Court
and within the Fourth Circuit over the past several years. In the
2014 Supreme Court case Clark v. Rameker, the debtor's mother
established an individual retirement account ("IRA") in 2000.40
The debtor's mother subsequently passed away in 2001, at which
point the IRA passed to the debtor and became an inherited
IRA. 4 The debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2010.42 The debtor listed
the inherited IRA as exempt under Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)
(3)(C). 3 The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the claimed exemption,
arguing that the funds in the inherited IRA did not qualify as "re-
tirement funds" within the meaning of the statute.
The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee's argument and
disallowed the debtor's exemption.5 The district court reversed,
holding that the exemption covers accounts containing funds that
were "'originally' 'accumulated for retirement purposes."'4 6 The
Seventh Circuit then reversed the district court, finding that be-
cause inherited IRAs are available for current consumption they
38. See, e.g., Pretrial Order at 3-4, Terry v. Evans (In re Evans), 527 B.R. 228 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2015).
39. Tice, Sieg & Gaffey, supra note 3, at 51.
40. 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 (2014).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) (2012); Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245.
44. Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245.
45. Id. at 2246.
46. Id. (quoting Clark v. Rameker (In re Clark), 466 B.R. 135, 139 (W.D. Wis. 2012)).
2015]
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are not a form of retirement savings.47 The debtor appealed to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision.
48
The Court distinguished traditional IRAs from inherited IRAs,
noting that the traditional variety imposes a 10% penalty on any
funds withdrawn from the account prior to the holder reaching
the age of fifty-nine and one-half.49 The holder of an inherited
IRA, on the other hand, is permitted to withdraw funds at any
time without incurring a penalty (and is in fact required to do so
within five years after the original owner's death or take mini-
mum distributions annually)."° The additional penalty imposed by
the Internal Revenue Code helps ensure that the traditional IRA
is "used for retirement purposes and not as general tax-
advantaged savings vehicles .... .""
While the Bankruptcy Code does not define "retirement funds,"
the Court found the ordinary meaning of the phrase, "sums of
money set aside for the day an individual stops working," instruc-
tive.52 The Court then imposed an objective test, whereby the
court must examine "the legal characteristics of the account in
which the funds are held, asking whether.., the account is one
set aside for the day when an individual stops working."" The
Supreme Court held that inherited funds were not exempt and, as
a result, debtors are now prohibited from claiming an exemption
in inherited IRAs.54
In another case dealing with inherited funds, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held in Carroll v. Logan that the debtor's Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy estate includes an inheritance obtained more than 180
days after the limit imposed by Bankruptcy Code § 541."5 The
47. Id. at 2246.
48. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split between the
Seventh and Fifth Circuit, which held in In re Chilton, that funds contained in an inherit-
ed IRA constituted "retirement funds" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522 and were
therefore exempt from the bankruptcy estate. 674 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2012).
49. 26 U.S.C. § 72(q)(1)-(2) (2012); Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2247-48.
50. Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2247.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 72(q)(1)-( 2) (2012); Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245.
52. Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2246.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2249-50.
55. 735 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 2013); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2012) (providing
that property of the estate includes "property that would have been property of the estate
if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition,
and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such
[Vol. 50:1
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Carrolls filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in February 2009 and the court confirmed the debt-
ors' plan in August 2009.56 In August 2012, the debtors notified
the bankruptcy court that Mr. Carroll expected to receive an in-
heritance of $100,000 because of the death of his mother." The
Chapter 13 trustee moved to modify the debtors' estate to include
an amount of the inheritance sufficient to pay all unsecured cred-
itors in full.5" The bankruptcy court held that the inheritance was
property of the estate, over the debtors' objection.59 The bankrupt-
cy court noted a direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit."
The Carrolls' argument on appeal was that the bankruptcy
court incorrectly included the inheritance in their estate because
Bankruptcy Code § 541 imposes a 180-day time limit for identify-
ing property that must be included in the bankruptcy estate.6 '
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reading § 541 in conjunction with §
1306(a).6 2 While § 541 generally imposes a 180-day limitation, §
1306(a) operates to expand the scope of § 541 to also include "all
property of the kind specified in [§ 541] that the debtor acquires
after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed,
dismissed, or converted.., whichever occurs first."6 Thus, these
two sections create the following formula for calculating property
of the estate in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases: (1) all property de-
scribed in § 541; plus (2) "[t]he kind of property (e.g., inheritanc-
es) described in Section 541 and acquired before the Chapter 13
case is closed, dismissed, or converted.64
date-(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance . .
56. Carroll, 735 F.3d at 149.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 149-50.
61. Id. at 150.
62. Id.
63. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(5), 1306(a)(1) (2012).
64. Carroll, 735 F.3d at 151. This decision places the Fourth Circuit in agreement
with a number of bankruptcy courts in other circuits that have addressed this issue. See,
e.g., In re Brensing, 337 B.R. 376, 383 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 805,
806 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Drew, 325 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re
Solis, 137 B.R. 121, 126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). In 2000, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia decided a substantially similar issue. In
Montclair Property Owners Ass'n. v. Reynard (In re Reynard), Judge Mayer held that "the
estate continues and assets set out in § 1306(a) acquired after confirmation become prop-
erty of the chapter 13 estate when acquired." 250 BR. 241, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
20151
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The Supreme Court also dealt with property of the estate in the
case of Law v. Siegel. In Siegel, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and
Siegel was appointed the trustee in the case.65 The debtor's estate
was essentially comprised of a single asset-the debtor's house
valued at $363,348."6 The debtor claimed that $75,000 of the
home's value was exempt under California's homestead exemp-
tion, and disclosed two liens on the home-one note for
$147,156.52, and another for $156,929.04.67 Therefore, the proper-
ty had no equity.68 Siegel brought an adversary proceeding to
strip off the second mortgage alleging that it was fraudulent.69 Af-
ter extensive litigation, the bankruptcy court ultimately deter-
mined that 'the loan was a fiction, meant to preserve [Law's] eq-
uity in his residence beyond what he was entitled to exempt' by
perpetrating 'a fraud on his creditors and the court.""'7 Siegel in-
curred more than $500,000 in legal fees "overcoming Law's
fraudulent misrepresentations. [The bankruptcy court] therefore
granted Siegel's motion to 'surcharge' the entirety of Law's
$75,000 homestead exemption, making those funds available to
defray Siegel's attorney's fees."'"
The Supreme Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Code did not
authorize such a "surcharge."72 While § 105(a) does provide the
bankruptcy court with the power "necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title," the Court noted that the
statutory provision does not allow the bankruptcy court to ignore
specific mandates in the Code.73 The Court held that the "sur-
charge" violated express provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 522 by
ordering an amount protected by the debtor's homestead exemp-
tion to be used to reimburse the trustee for attorney's fees, which
is an administrative expense."
65. 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1193 (2014).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting In re Law, 401 B.R. 447, 453 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1195.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1194.
74. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1195.
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The Supreme Court also addressed the topic of legal fees in its
decision Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC.75 This case involved
Bankruptcy Code § 330(a), which applies to professional fees for
all professionals employed in a bankruptcy case.6 In this case, the
reorganized debtor challenged its bankruptcy counsel's request
for compensation, despite the fact that bankruptcy counsel suc-
cessfully helped reorganize the debtor in a manner that ultimate-
ly paid all creditors in full.7 7 After extensive discovery and a six-
day trial on attorney's fees, the bankruptcy court overruled the
reorganized debtor's objections, awarded professional fees, and
also awarded the law firm over $5 million in fees for the time ex-
pended defending the fee applications.8
The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not
permit bankruptcy courts to award additional attorney fees to
professionals employed by the estate for expenses incurred de-
fending fee applications filed with the court 9 In essence, the
Court found that § 330(a)(1), which provides that fees may be
awarded for 'reasonable compensation for actual, necessary ser-
vices rendered' neither specifically nor explicitly authorizes
courts to shift the costs of adversarial litigation from one side to
the other-in this case, from the attorneys seeking fees to the
administrator of the estate-as most statutes that displace the
American Rule do."80
The Supreme Court also resolved a relatively narrow issue
dealing with property of the estate in Harris v. Viegelahn.8" There
the Court considered what happens to the funds that the Chapter
13 trustee has collected from the debtor's wages and is holding to
distribute to creditors when the Chapter 13 debtor converts his
case to Chapter 7.V2 The Court found that Bankruptcy Code §
348(f) "makes one thing clear: A debtor's postpetition wages, in-
cluding undisbursed funds in the hands of a trustee, ordinarily do
not become part of the Chapter 7 estate created by conversion."83
75. 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2162 (2015).
76. Id. at 2162-63.
77. Id. at 2163.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2165.
80. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2012)).
81. 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1834 (2015).
82. Id. at 1834-35.
83. Id. at 1837; see also 11 U.S.C. § 348(o (2012).
20151
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While this provision is unclear on what should happen to those
funds following conversion, the Court decided that it would not be
compatible with the Code if those funds were to be distributed to
creditors upon conversion.84 Therefore, the Court held that undis-
tributed plan payments made by the debtor from his or her wages
that are being held by the Chapter 13 trustee at the time the
debtor converts to Chapter 7 must be returned to the debtor.85
The final noteworthy decision on the topic of property of the es-
tate comes from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Virginia. In Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors v. Virginia Broadband, LLC (In re Virginia Broadband,
LLC), one of the managing members of the debtor-LLC filed a
personal Chapter 13 petition, which was quickly dismissed twen-
ty days after it was filed.86 Virginia law provides that a member-
ship interest in an LLC constitutes personal property87 and that
upon an LLC member filing for bankruptcy the member retains
his economic interest in the LLC, but loses all management au-
thority over the LLC.88 While the individual Chapter 13 case was
still pending, the debtor-member participated in an action that
replaced two other members of the debtor-LLC.89 After the debtor-
member's individual Chapter 13 case was dismissed, the debtor-
member and other managers ratified and re-authorized the prior
action that replaced two other members of the debtor-LLC and ul-
timately authorized the LLC to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.90
The unsecured creditor's committee objected to the LLC's bank-
ruptcy filing, arguing that under Virginia law the debtor-member
lost all non-economic rights in the LLC upon his own bankruptcy
filing. 91 If the debtor-member's vote was removed from the prior
actions that ultimately resulted in the debtor-LLC filing for
bankruptcy, no majority vote existed and those actions are of no
effect.92
84. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1837.
85. Id.
86. 498 B.R. 90, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013).
87. Id. at 94; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1038 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
88. In re Virginia Broadband, LLC, 498 B.R. at 93-94; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1040.1(6)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
89. In re Virginia Broadband, LLC, 498 B.R. at 92.
90. Id. at 92-93.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id.
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The court determined that Bankruptcy Code § 541(c) overrides
the Virginia law restriction on transfer of property of the estate.93
Despite the debtor-member's personal bankruptcy filing, his en-
tire interest in the LLC became property of his personal bank-
ruptcy estate under § 541(a).94 Bankruptcy Code § 349(b)(3) pro-
vides that upon dismissal of a case, property of the estate is re-
vested "in the entity in which such property was vested immedi-
ately before the commencement of the case under this title.95
This provision reverses the effects of the debtor-member's filing
and restores property to its position prior to the case.96 Dismissal
re-vested the debtor-member with the entirety of his pre-petition
management authority, thus providing him with the authority to
ratify the prior members' action.9'
III. AUTOMATIC STAY
The first noteworthy case that considered the effect of the au-
tomatic stay comes from the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Virginia. In Sexton v. IRS (In re Sexton),
the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed her antici-
pated 2012 tax refund as an asset, which she exempted by filing a
homestead deed.98 The debtor scheduled a debt owed to the Unit-
ed States Department of Agriculture ("DOA") as one of her liabili-
ties.99 This debt arose out of a pre-petition secured loan on which
the debtor defaulted.' After a foreclosure sale insufficient to sat-
isfy the debt, the DOA held that the deficiency claim was unse-
cured."' The Chapter 7 trustee certified that there were no assets
available for distribution to creditors, and the debtor received a
discharge, including a discharge of the DOA debt."2 Prior to the
discharge, the DOA and IRS notified the debtor that the govern-
ment was withholding the debtor's 2012 tax return and applying
93. Id. at 97.
94. Id. at 94-96; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (2012).
96. In re Virginia Broadband, LLC, 498 B.R. at 97.
97. Id.
98. 508 B.R. 646, 650 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2014); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4 (Repl.
Vol. 2014 & Supp. 2015), 34-13 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
99. In re Sexton, 508 B.R. at 650.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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those funds to the DOA debt."°3 The debtor objected to the gov-
ernment's offset but the IRS and DOA failed to respond.' The
debtor subsequently moved to reopen her bankruptcy case in or-
der to challenge the offset."5 The debtor filed an adversary pro-
ceeding against the IRS and DOA, alleging that the government
violated the automatic stay by offsetting, post-petition, the debt-
or's pre-petition debt to the DOA with her 2012 tax return.'
The government, relying on the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in IRS v. Luongo (In re Lu-
ongo),'°7 argued that the tax refund was contingent and that the
debtor was not entitled to receive any funds until "[a]fter the Sec-
retary of the Treasury complies with the provisions of 26 U.S.C. §
6402(d) and applies the tax overpayment to satisfy [the debtor's]
preexisting debt to the DOA ....
The court declined to follow the reasoning in In re Luongo and
held that the government willfully committed a violation of the
automatic stay.0 9 But the court found that the government's con-
duct was insufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive dam-
ages under Fourth Circuit precedent."' The court ordered the IRS
to remit the tax refund to the debtor, and it also required the gov-
ernment to bear the debtor's attorney's fees and costs."'
In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Construction Supervision
Services, Inc. (In re Construction Supervision Services, Inc.), the
issue before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was "whether
construction subcontractors entitled to a lien on funds under
103. Id. at 650-51.
104. Id. at 651.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 259 F.3d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing the IRS to set off the debtor's tax re-
turn for the pre-petition taxable year against a tax liability for a- previous pre-petition tax-
able year that had been discharged).
108. In re Sexton, 508 B.R. at 653.
109. Id. at 662.
110. Id. at 667; see also Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf (In re Strumpf), 37 F.3d 155,
159 (4th Cir. 1994) ('To constitute a willful act, the creditor need not act with specific in-
tent but must only commit an intentional act with knowledge of the automatic stay.").
111. In re Sexton, 508 B.R. at 667. The government subsequently appealed this decision
to the district court, which held that "[t]he USDA failed to timely note its appeal, and the
court [did] not have jurisdiction to that hear it. Accordingly, the court [affirmed] the bank-
ruptcy court's ... order and [dismissed] the USDA's appeal U.S. Dep't of Agric. v.
Sexton, 529 B.R. 667, 675 (W.D. Va. 2015).
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North Carolina law had an interest in property when the debtor
contractor filed for bankruptcy, by which time the subcontractors
had not yet served notice of, and thereby perfected, their liens."'12
The facts of the case are straightforward. The debtor served as a
general contractor and hired various subcontractors that fur-
nished materials for projects.113 Once the general contractor filed
for bankruptcy, the subcontractors sought to serve notice of and
perfect liens on funds that others owed to the general contrac-
tor. '14 Additionally, the subcontractors "asked the bankruptcy
court to clarify the extent of the stay to determine whether their
post-petition notice and perfection would fall within the stay's
ambit," essentially asking the court whether the subcontractors
could properly perfect these pre-petition liens.1 5
The court considered Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(3), holding that
it permits the post-petition perfection of an interest in property
that arose pre-petition in certain limited instances."6 Section
362(b)(3) provides an exception to the automatic stay for "any act
to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest
in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are
subject to such perfection under section 546(b) .. . .""' An excep-
tion exists for those that hold an unperfected interest in property
that predates the bankruptcy filing if "the perfected interest
would be effective against a third party acquiring rights prior to
that perfection" in the absence of bankruptcy."8 Following this de-
termination, the court examined the applicable North Carolina
law, finding that upon delivery of materials to a general contrac-
tor, subcontractors are ntitled to "a lien upon funds that are
owed to the contractor ... that arise out of the improvement on
which the first tier subcontractor worked or furnished materi-
als.""' 9 Because the subcontractors in the case delivered materials
prior to the petition date, the subcontractors had an interest in
112. 753 F.3d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 2014).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 132.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (2012); see also id. § 546(b)(1)(A) (2012) (subjecting the bank-
ruptcy trustee's rights and powers to laws permitting the perfection of a security interest
"to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of
perfection").
118. In re Constr. Supervision Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d at 126.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(a) (2014).
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the property as of the date the materials were delivered.2 ' There-
fore, the exception in Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(3) applied and
the subcontractors could perfect post-petition.2'
IV. ASSET SALES
A. Credit Bidding
One bankruptcy topic that drew significant attention within
the past several years concerns the rights of secured creditors to
credit bid. This issue not only was considered by the Supreme
Court but it also produced a widely discussed case from the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
First, in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
the Supreme Court held that a Chapter 11 "cram down" plan'22
that proposes sale of collateral may not deprive a secured creditor
of the right to credit bid its claim.'23 The lender in this case held a
lien on substantially all of the debtor's assets. The assets had a
value that was less than the amount of the lender's claim."14 The
debtor proposed a plan that would result in a sale of substantially
all of the debtor's assets, with the sale proceeds going to the se-
cured lender.'25 The sale and bidding procedures prohibited the
secured lender from credit bidding its secured claim.2 s The se-
cured lender objected to this treatment under the debtor's pro-
120. In re Constr. Supervision Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d at 131-32.
121. Id. at 132. One final, relatively minor, point of law worth referencing before con-
cluding this section is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virgin-
ia's decision in Sanders v. Farina. In this case the Alexandria Division held that the au-
tomatic stay of § 362(a)(1), which stays
the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement
of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title
does not prevent the district court from remanding a case to state court. 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1) (2012); Sanders v. Farina, 67 F. Supp. 3d 727, 729 (E.D. Va. 2014).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
123. 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012).
124. Id. at 2068-69.
125. Id. at 2069.
126. Id. Credit bidding is the process whereby a secured lender can use the debt it is
owed as an offset against the purchase price. See id.
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posed plan, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor's sale and
bidding procedures, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
127
The Supreme Court affirmed."8 Section 1129(a) generally pro-
vides that a court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan only if each
class of affected creditors accepts the plan.12 However, the court
may also confirm a plan if it does not discriminate against and is
fair and equitable to each impaired, non-consenting class.3 ' Un-
der § 1129(b)(2)(A), a plan is fair and equitable to a class of se-
cured claims if it provides:
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and (II) that each holder of a claim of such
class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments total-
ing at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the ef-
fective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest
in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of
such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and
the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims."1
Section 363(k) authorizes the holder of a secured claim to credit
bid the amount of its claim unless the court, for cause, orders oth-
erwise.112 Relying on the statutory interpretation maxim that the
specific governs the general, the Court held that subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) could not apply to a matter that is specifically
governed by subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).'33 Therefore, even if the
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2073.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2012) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the fol-
lowing requirements are met: ... (8) With respect to each class of claims or interests-(A)
such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired under the plan."); see
also RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2069-70.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012); see also RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2069.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012).
132. Id. § 363(k) (2012) ("At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that
is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders other-
wise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim pur-
chases such property, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such
property.").
133. RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2070-71.
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resulting sale would provide the secured lender with the indubi-
table equivalent of its claim, the plan still must satisfy subsection
(b)(2)(A)(ii) by allowing the lender to credit bid, unless the court
orders otherwise for cause."' As the debtor could not identify any
such "cause" in this case, the Court could not confirm the plan.135
In In re The Free Lance-Star Publishing Co. of Fredericksburg,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for Eastern District of Vir-
ginia found sufficient cause to limit the credit bidding rights of a
secured debt purchaser.136 In January 2014, the Free Lance-Star
Publishing Company of Fredericksburg and a property develop-
ment company filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11.117 Pri-
or to the petition date, the debtors borrowed funds from Branch
Banking and Trust ("BB&T") in the amount of $50.8 million.131 As
security for this loan, the debtors granted BB&T liens and securi-
ty interests on various pieces of the debtors' personal and real
property.'!9 Notably, BB&T did not obtain a lien on certain assets
associated with the debtors' radio broadcasting activities, includ-
ing the leases and rents derived therefrom, FCC licenses, rolling
stock, insurance policies, bank accounts, or any proceeds that
may be derived from the disposition of any of these assets (collec-
tively, the "Unencumbered Assets").4 '
DSP Acquisition, LLC ("DSP") purchased BB&T's loan and
immediately began negotiation with the debtors for a bankruptcy
sale whereby DSP would be able to credit bid to acquire all of the
debtors' assets.' After its purchase of the loan and without in-
forming the debtor, DSP attempted to obtain liens on the Unen-
cumbered Assets.' DSP and the debtors continued negotiations,
during which DSP demanded that the advertisement period for
the sale of the debtors' assets be shortened, and any related ad-
vertising materials include a disclosure that any sale would be
subject to DSP's right to credit bid. 4' The debtors refused this
134. Id. at 2072.
135. Id. at 2070 n.3.
136. 512 B.R. 798, 808 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
137. Id. at 799.
138. Id. at 802.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 802, 805-06.
141. Id. at 802-03 & n.5.
142. Id. at 803.
143. Id. at 806.
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proposal and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy without an agree-
ment with DSP.44
After filing, the debtors sought to sell substantially all of their
assets. 45 The approved bidding procedures provided that DSP had
the right to credit bid its valid liens "as either (i) agreed to by the
Debtors, DSP, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Credi-
,,146tors... or (ii) as determined by the Court at a hearing ....
The parties failed to reach an agreement, and the court conducted
a hearing to determine the validity of DSP's liens and its right to
credit bid.'47
The court held that DSP did not have a valid, perfected securi-
ty interest in the Unencumbered Assets and limited the right of
DSP to credit bid in this case.'48 As stated above, Bankruptcy
Code § 363(k) allows the court to prohibit a secured creditor from
credit bidding its claim for cause.'49 While credit bidding is in-
tended to protect against undervaluation, when a credit bid of a
purchased claim has the potential to depress the market-as was
the case here due to DSP's aggressive loan-to-own strategy-its
intended purpose is thwarted.5 Because credit bidding is not an
absolute right, the court limited DSP's right to credit bid as a re-
sult of DSP's inequitable conduct.' Here, DSP did not have a lien
on all assets, engaged in an aggressive negotiating strategy, and
unilaterally filed financing statements."2 All of these actions had
an adverse effect, depressing enthusiasm for the sale in the mar-
ket and limiting participation in the auction process.'53 Thus, the
court found it necessary to limit DSP's right to credit bid to at-
tract new interest in the auction process and increase the overall
value of the debtor's assets."'
144. Id. at 803-04.
145. Id. at 799-800.
146. Id. at 800.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 807-08.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2012).
150. In re Free Lance-Star, 512 B.R. at 806.
151. Id. at 805-06.
152. Id. at 807-08.
153. Id. at 806-07.
154. Id. at 807-08. DSP sought an emergency interlocutory appeal of the bankruptcy
court's decision, which the district court denied, finding that DSP had no risk of irrepara-
ble harm if the appealed issues were not resolved prior to the auction and that the ap-
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Another noteworthy post-RadLAX decision is In re Fisker Au-
tomotive Holdings, Inc.155 In Fisker, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware similarly limited a secured
lender's right to credit bid, finding that bidding would be "frozen"
without a credit bid cap.'56 The United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Tennessee recently departed from Free
Lance-Star and Fisker, noting "that the mere 'chilling' of third
party bids is [not] sufficient cause to justify modifying or denying
a secured creditor's rights [to credit bid]."' '
These decisions following RadLAX have presented a number of
interesting issues regarding when the "for cause" exception in §
363(k) is appropriate. While credit bidding is undoubtedly an im-
portant protection for secured creditors, it is not a limitless pro-
tection and remains subject to court supervision. As the issues
presented by the "for cause" exception to credit bidding are highly
fact-specific, it will be interesting to see how this line of cases
continues to develop over the coming years.
B. General Asset Sale Issues
In In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, the bankruptcy court considered
the issue of whether a sublessee whose sublease was rejected by
the debtor was entitled to remain in possession of the property
following the debtor's sale of its leasehold interest in the property
free and clear of all interests.5 ' The debtor in the case was the
lessee of a gas station, who leased its own interest in the property
to a sublessee.' The appointed Chapter 11 trustee filed a motion
seeking authorization to sell substantially all of the debtor's as-
sets and to assume and assign the debtor's leases."'0 The trustee
proval of an interlocutory appeal was not appropriate because granting the appeal "is
more likely to impede, rather than hasten, resolution of the cases by delaying, for in-
stance, the Bankruptcy Court's ability to resolve the issues remaining." DSP Acquisition,
LLC v. Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co., 512 B.R. 808, 811, 814 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Hybrid
Tech Holdings, LLC v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fisker Auto. Holdings,
Inc. (In re Fisker Auto. Holdings), No. 14-CV99 (GMS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15497, at
*18 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014)).
155. 510 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
156. Id. at 60.
157. In re RML Dev., Inc., 528 B.R. 150, 155 n.l (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2014).
158. 482 B.R. 154, 156-57 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
159. Id. at 156.
160. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (detailing the law regarding executory con-
tracts and unexpired leases).
[Vol. 50:1
BANKRUPTCY LAW
subsequently sought to reject the lease between the debtor and
the sublessee.161 The debtor sold its interest in the lease at auc-
tion, and the court order approving the sale provided that the
buyer was to receive the purchased assets free and clear of all
claims.
162
The sublessee then filed a motion seeking a determination that
Bankruptcy Code § 365(h)(1)(A) allowed it to retain its rights un-
der the rejected sublease and remain in possession of the proper-
ty. ' The buyer responded by contending that the sublessee lost
all right to possess the property following the court's prior order
approving the sale.'
The court first identified that a split in authority exists regard-
ing whether a sale under § 363(f) extinguishes any right held un-
der § 365(h).1 6' The Seventh Circuit is the highest court to address
the issue. In Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ,
LLC, the court held that a sale under § 363(f) extinguished any
possessory interest that a sublessee may have held prior to the
sale. 1 66 Rather than following the Seventh Circuit, the court in-
stead found the reasoning of the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Massachusetts in In re Haskell L.P. more per-
suasive. 167 In Haskell, the court held that a sale free and clear
does not extinguish a sublessee's right to possession.168 Because §
365(h)(1)(A) allows a lessee to retain its rights under the lease fol-
lowing rejection for the term of the lease so long as the lease is
enforceable under non-bankruptcy law, the court held that the
transaction that took place had a dual nature: (1) a sale free and
clear, and (2) an assumption and assignment.16 The parties were
on notice that § 365 applied to the sale because the asset sale
agreement contained a list of the leases to be assumed and as-
signed, and the lease at issue was explicitly rejected under §
365." 0 The court concluded by noting that even if the facts were
different and the transaction was solely a § 363 sale, the result
161. In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. at 156.
162. Id. at 156-57.
163. Id. at 158; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A) (2012).
164. In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. at 158.
165. Id. at 160.
166. 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003).
167. In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. at 160-63.
168. 321 B.R. 1, 9-10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A) (2012); In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. at 163.
170. In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. at 163.
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would be identical, as "[t]he rights of the tenant may not be ex-
tinguished by a § 363 sale; to hold to the contrary would give open
license to debtors to dispossess tenants by utilizing the § 363 sale
mechanism."'71
The Fourth Circuit has also decided a case dealing with asset
sales. In Reeves v. Callaway, the Chapter 7 trustee sought to sell
the debtor's residence free and clear under § 363.172 The parties
stipulated to the fact that the property had a fair market value of
$325,000, but the property was encumbered by a first mortgage
and federal tax lien totaling more than $575,000.173 The debtors
objected to the trustee's sale on the grounds that the value of
their interest in the property did not exceed the aggregate inter-
est the debtors claimed as exempt under North Carolina law,
namely $60,000.17' The debtors reasoned that their right to claim
the property entirely exempt under § 522 removed the property
from the bankruptcy estate.175 Therefore, they argued, the court
lacked any authority to permit a sale under § 363.76
The Fourth Circuit held that the allowance of an exemption on-
ly affected the debtors' interest in the property of the bankruptcy
estate and not the actual property itself.77 While the debtors were
allowed to exempt a $60,000 aggregate interest in the property
subordinate to the mortgage and tax lien, the "[d]ebtors' argu-
ment that the Trustee lacks the statutory authority to sell Debt-
ors' Residence because such asset is no longer property of the
bankruptcy estate is without merit.' 78
V. DISCHARGE
Courts have not been especially active in deciding issues relat-
ed to discharge, but a few cases warrant discussion. First, the
Supreme Court's decision in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.
settled the standard of proof needed to prevail on a claim brought
171. Id.
172. 546 F. App'x 235, 238 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)
(2012).
173. Reeves, 546 F. App'x at 237.
174. Id. at 239; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(1) (2014).
175. Reeves, 546 F. App'x at 239.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 240-41.
178. Id. at 241-42.
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under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(4). '79 Bankruptcy Code § 523
(a)(4) provides that a debt incurred "for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny" is non-
dischargeable.18°
Prior to Bullock, disagreement existed among lower courts as
to whether the word "defalcation" in § 523(a)(4) included a scien-
ter requirement, and, if so, what evidence was required to meet
that burden.' For example, in the Fourth Circuit, "negligence or
even an innocent mistake which results in misappropriation or
failure to account is sufficient" to prove defalcation."2 In contrast,
other circuits required a finding of objective or extreme reckless-
ness."'83 Settling this circuit split, the Supreme Court ultimately
held that if "bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral con-
duct" is not present, there must be a finding of intent, which in-
cludes not only intentional wrongdoing but also reckless con-
duct.
1 8 4
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia recently had the opportunity to apply the new Bullock
standard. In Figuers v. Roberson (In re Roberson), the current
trustee of a trust filed suit against the former trustee, alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty.'8' The current trustee based his claim on
allegations that the former trustee charged excessive hourly fees,
made loans that harmed the trust, failed to identify and prevent
an employee from embezzling nearly $200,000, used trust funds
to pay personal debts, and charged an unauthorized commission
on the sale of trust property.'86 The former trustee subsequently
179. 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
181. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1758.
182. Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir.
2001); see also Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011) (stat-
ing that even innocent acts can result in a finding of defalcation and that no intent to de-
fraud is required).
183. See, e.g., Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1165-66
(11th Cir. 2012); Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2002).
184. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759. When defining reckless conduct, the Supreme Court
looked to the Model Penal Code; thus, "[w]here actual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking,
[the court will] consider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary 'consciously disregards' (or
is willfully blind to) 'a substantial and unjustifiable risk' that his conduct will turn out to
violate a fiduciary duty." Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2)(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1985)).
185. No. 13-11103-BFK, 2014 WL 1876340, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 8, 2014).
186. Id. at "1-8.
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filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which precipitated the filing of a
complaint under § 523(a)(4) objecting to the dischargeability of
the claim held by the current trustee. 187
Under Bullock, the court determined that the former trustee's
hourly fees and imprudent loans did not equate to defalcation.'9 8
The fees were not excessively unreasonable and the loans did not
rise to the level of reckless disregard of the trustee's fiduciary du-
ty.189 Notably, the court held that while the trustee's "actions here
could be described as a breach of his fiduciary duties under State
law, the Court [found] that his actions [did] not rise to the level of
willfulness or a reckless disregard of a known duty under Bull-
ock," and thus, the debts were dischargeable.9
Despite these findings, however, the court determined that the
trustee's failure to supervise the employee embezzling funds and
reconcile bank records that would have revealed this misconduct
did rise to the level of "a conscious disregard of his known duties
as a fiduciary within the meaning of Bullock."'' Additionally, tak-
ing an unauthorized commission on the disposition of trust assets
and using trust assets to pay personal debts both amounted to
knowing violations of a fiduciary duty, making these debts non-
dischargeable.9 While application of the new Bullock standard
will be highly fact dependent, In re Roberson represents the first
application of this standard by a court within the Eastern District
of Virginia.
The next noteworthy case dealing with dischargeability is
Lewis v. Long (In re Long). The debtor, Mr. Long, was involved in
a sexual relationship with a minor, Ms. Lewis, at various times
between 1999 and 2000.193 The debtor and Ms. Lewis ultimately
conceived a child.94 As a result of this relationship, the debtor
pled guilty to two counts of carnal knowledge under Virginia Code
section 18.2-63.15 Following the debtor's conviction, Ms. Lewis ob-
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id. at *9-11.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *12.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *12-13.
193. Lewis v. Long (In re Long), 504 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2014).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Supp. 2015).
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tained a default civil judgment against the debtor for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and sexual assault and battery.
196
The debtor did not make any appearance in the civil case prior to
appearing pro se at the default judgment hearing.'97
Turning to the bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Ms. Lewis
filed a nondischargeability suit against the debtor, alleging that
the judgment obtained in state court could not be discharged un-
der § 523(a)(6).15 At the conclusion of Ms. Lewis's case in chief,
the debtor argued that she failed to present evidence sufficient to
establish intent, as the only evidence Ms. Lewis presented at trial
was information pertaining to the parties' relationship, and that
she obtained a default judgment against the debtor in state
court.' Ms. Lewis argued that she did not need to prove intent in
the adversary proceeding because the state court default judg-
ment had a collateral estoppel effect.2°
The court held that Ms. Lewis failed to carry her evidentiary
burden.2 ' The state court judgment did not have any collateral
estoppel effect because the bankruptcy court was unable to de-
termine which issues were actually litigated in state court and
the court had no evidence before it that the state court made any
finding regarding the debtor's intent.22 For an issue to be subject
to collateral estoppel, it must have actually been previously liti-
gated."' While the debtor was present at the default judgment
hearing, such presence, on its own, did not prove the issue was
actually litigated.2 4
One final issue in the case dealt with a waiver of dischargeabil-
ity provision included in a note signed by the debtor in favor of
Ms. Lewis, which the parties entered into prior to the petition
date.20 ' The court found the provision unenforceable because the
196. In re Long, 504 B.R. at 427.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012) (excepting from discharge debts incurred "for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity").
199. In re Long, 504 B.R. at 428-29.
200. Id. at 429.
201. Id. at 436.
202. Id. at 434-35.
203. Id. at 429-30.
204. Id. at 433.
205. Id. at 427-28.
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debtor did not reaffirm the debt under Bankruptcy Code §
524(c)."' Therefore, the bankruptcy court held that the default
judgment did not have a collateral estoppel effect, Ms. Lewis
failed to prove that her injury was the result of willful and mali-
cious conduct as required by the statute, and the waiver of dis-
chargeability provision signed by the debtor was unenforceable."7
Ms. Lewis subsequently appealed the bankruptcy court's decision,
which the district court later affirmed.2 6
Before leaving this section, perhaps the largest issue looming
within the realm of dischargeability is the treatment of student
loans. While this topic has garnered a significant amount of
200scholarly attention, cases within the Fourth Circuit have re-
mained consistent in disallowing the discharge of student loan
debts following the adoption of the Brunner test in 2005.21°
VI. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
The Fourth Circuit has been quite active in the area of avoid-
ance actions recently, issuing several decisions since 2013. The
first case is Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC
(In re Derivium Capital LLC), where the debtor filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy after its alleged Ponzi scheme collapsed.21 Essen-
tially, the debtor directed customers to deposit securities directly
into a bank account in exchange for loans worth 90% of the
stock's current market value.212 When these loans reached ma-
206. Id. at 437-38.
207. Id. at 438-39.
208. Lewis v. Long, 521 B.R. 745, 753-54 (W.D. Va. 2014).
209. See, e.g., Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and
the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012); Richard B. Keeton, Guar-
anteed to Work or It's Free!: The Evolution of Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and
the Ninth Circuit's Ruling in Hedlund v. Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 65 (2015).
210. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th
Cir. 2005) (adopting the Brunner test for determining dischargeability of student loans);
see Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 31 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam). One of the more noteworthy cases decided in Virginia in the past several
years dealing with the dischargeability of student loans is Erbschloe v. Department of
Education (In re Erbschloe), where the court held that the debt remaining after the debt-
or's completion of an income-based repayment plan represents the portion of student loan
debt that imposes an undue hardship. 502 B.R. 470, 483 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013).
211. 716 F.3d 355, 358 (4th Cir. 2013).
212. Id. at 359.
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turity, the debtor gave borrowers the option to repay the princi-
pal, plus interest, and regain their stock, surrender the stock, or
refinance the terms of the loan.213 The debtor promised customers
that it would hedge their collateral, but instead the debtor di-
rected the bank to immediately transfer the stocks into different
accounts and liquidate them.21' The court eventually converted
the case to Chapter 7, and the trustee filed nine tort claims
against the bank and two claims under Bankruptcy Code §§ 544
and 548. 2"5 The trustee later assigned these claims to Grayson
Consulting.216
The Fourth Circuit held that the transfers were not "an inter-
est of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor," and therefore Grayson Consulting could not prevail on
the claims brought under §§ 544 and 548.217 Next, the court held
that the bank was not the "initial transferee" under § 550, and
therefore could not recover any fraudulently transferred proper-
ty.218 Third, under § 546(e), a trustee cannot avoid a transfer, ex-
cept in some very limited situations, of an interest of the debtor
in property that is a "settlement payment" to a stockbroker.19 A
settlement payment is generally defined to include "preliminary
settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim
settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final
settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly
used in the securities trade."2 The court determined that the
commissions paid to the bank in this case were reasonable and
customary, and therefore fell under the defense of § 546(e).22' Fi-
nally, the Fourth Circuit determined that as the assignee of the
trustee, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Grayson Consulting
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012) (providing the trustee with the power to avoid
certain pre-bankruptcy transfers made by the debtor that could have been avoided by a
judgment lienholder or a bona fide purchaser); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012) (allowing the trustee
to avoid fraudulent transfers made by the debtor prior to the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case).
216. In re Derivium Capital, LLC, 716 F.3d at 359.
217. Id. at 361; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1), 548(a) (2012).
218. In re Derivium Capital, LLC, 716 F.3d at 362; see also 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2012).
219. In re Derivium Capital, LLC, 716 F.3d at 361; see also 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2012).
221. In re Derivium Capital, LLC, 716 F.3d at 364-65.
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from suing on the alleged torts because the debtor engaged in the
alleged torts.222
The second Fourth Circuit case is Guttman v. Construction
Program Group (In re Railworks Corp.). In this case, the debtor,
Railworks, purchased insurance through an insurance agent.2 23
Construction Program Group ("CPG") served as the general un-
derwriter for the debtor's insurance company and it collected all
premiums for the insurance company.24 The litigation trustee
brought an action to avoid and recover premiums transferred by
the debtor to CPG.225 The debtor made a number of payments to
CPG within the ninety days before the petition date.226 CPG later
transferred the payments it had collected to the insurance com-
227pany.
Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1) allows a trustee to recover a
transfer for the benefit of the estate from "the initial transferee of
such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was
made.,228 Because CPG was not the initial transferee, the trustee
made the argument that CPG was "the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made.2 29
The court held that CPG, as underwriter, did not qualify as an
"entity for whose benefit" the debtor's premium payments were
made.23 ° CPG served as a mere conduit for the party with the re-
lationship with the debtor.2"' Thus, the trustee was not permitted
to recover the premium payments.2 2
The final Fourth Circuit case in the topic area that this article
will cover is Gold v. First Tennessee Bank N.A. (In re Taneja).233 In
this case, a bank opened a credit line to a mortgage originator,
222. Id. at 366-69.
223. Guttman v. Constr. Program Grp. (In re Railworks Corp.), 760 F.3d 398, 400 (4th
Cir. 2014).
224. Id. at 401.
225. Id. at 400.
226. Id. at 402.
227. Id. at 400.
228. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2012).
229. Id.; In re Railworks Corp., 760 F.3d at 404.
230. In re Railworks Corp., 760 F.3d at 404.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 405.
233. 743 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2014).
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unaware that the mortgage originator had been creating fraudu-
lent mortgages.234 During the economic downturn, the mortgage
originator began to have difficulty selling mortgages on the sec-
ondary market and was unable to pay the bank on time." The
bank ultimately pressured the originator for repayment, at which
point the originator repaid a large portion of the credit line prior
to filing for bankruptcy.23 6 The trustee sought to recover payments
from the defendant bank based on the premise that they were
fraudulent transfers, arguing that the bank knew, or should have
known that the debtor acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud over the course of its operations.237
A fraudulent transferee is not liable to the extent value was
taken in good faith.23' This good faith requirement contains both
an objective and subjective element.239 Subjective good faith re-
quires honesty in fact and an innocent state of mind, while objec-
tive good faith requires that the party act in a commercially rea-
sonable manner, abiding by routine business practices.2" Here,
the court found that the bank's conduct was standard in the
banking industry, and that the bank sought and reasonably re-
ceived assurances that the originator was not issuing fraudulent
mortgages.2 1 The court took the economic downturn into consid-
eration, to which the bank reasonably could have attributed the
originator's problems.22 Therefore, the bank acted reasonably in
good faith.243
VII. STANDING, CONFIRMATION, AND RES JUDICATA
This topic area of standing, confirmation, and res judicata is
divided into two subsections. First, this section addresses case
developments dealing with standing itself. Next, this section
turns attention toward confirmation and res judicata issues, a
234. Id. at 425.
235. Id. at 426.
236. Id. at 426-27.
237. Id. at 427.
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2012).
239. In re Taneja, 743 F.3d at 430.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 430-31.
242. See id. at 434.
243. Id.
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topic which has produced a number of noteworthy and interesting
decisions recently.
A. Standing
In Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered the issue of whether a Chapter 13 debtor retains standing to
file a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA"). 244 The Fourth Circuit began by noting that in the
Chapter 7 context, the court has recognized "[i]f a cause of action
is part of the estate of the bankrupt then the trustee alone has
standing to bring that claim."'245 While the court had made this de-
termination in Chapter 7, it had not "considered to what extent
the Chapter 13 debtor-who, unlike the Chapter 7 debtor, retains
possession of the bankruptcy estate-may also possess standing
to assert a cause of action, either exclusive of, or concurrent with,
the authority vested in the trustee.46
While this was an open question in the Fourth Circuit, all other
circuits that addressed the question determined that Chapter 13
debtors retain standing to bring a cause of action on their own
behalf for the benefit of the estate.247 Following these other circuit
decisions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that unlike a Chapter 7
debtor, a Chapter 13 debtor may maintain non-bankruptcy causes
of action concurrent with the trustee.248
In SunTrust Bank v. Matson (In re CHN Construction, LLC),
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia examined the rights of a secured creditor in Chapter 7 to
pursue avoidance actions on behalf of the Chapter 7 trustee.249 In
this case, the Chapter 7 trustee and the principal secured creditor
disagreed whether a cash collateral order had specifically author-
ized a number of post-petition payments made by the debtor-in-
244. 717 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2013).
245. Id. (quoting Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th
Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original).
246. Id. at 343.
247. See Smith v. Rockett, 522 F.3d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008); Crosby v. Monroe Cty.,
394 F.3d 1328, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004); Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 200 F.3d 467, 472-
74 (7th Cir. 1999); Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 145 F.3d 513, 515-16 (2d Cir.
1998); Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1209 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991).
248. Wilson, 717 F.3d at 343.
249. 531 B.R. 126, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015).
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possession to a number of third parties who did business with the
debtor while the case was in Chapter 11.250 The trustee ultimately
decided not to pursue any avoidance actions against the third
parties under Bankruptcy Code § 54951 The creditor sought to
establish derivative standing so that it could pursue these actions
on the trustee's behalf.
252
The court recognized that despite the general rule that only
trustees and debtors-in-possession can pursue avoidance actions,
there are two limited situations where creditors are permitted to
pursue avoidance actions on behalf of the estate: (1) when the
trustee or debtor-in-possession unreasonably refuses to bring suit
on its own; and (2) where the trustee or debtor-in-possession
grants consent.9 Both of these exceptions, however, are only ap-
plicable in the context of Chapter 11, and are not applicable in
Chapter 7, where an independent fiduciary acting as an officer of
the court is specifically charged with deciding whether to bring
these actions.254 The court noted that the Chapter 7 trustee is
provided with a substantial degree of discretion, and the court
would be hesitant to substitute its own business judgment for
that of the trustee.5 Therefore, the court determined that the
trustee acted reasonably and the creditor was not permitted to
pursue the avoidance actions.256
B. Confirmation and Res Judicata
This has perhaps been one of the most active areas of bank-
ruptcy litigation within the Fourth Circuit recently. A number of
cases have been decided at the appellate level, including one re-
cent decision by the Supreme Court.
In Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, the Supreme Court resolved a
large circuit split by holding that the denial of confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan is not a final, appealable decision. 7 While the
250. Id. at 128-29.
251. Id. at 129.
252. Id. at 127.
253. Id. at 131.
254. Id. at 131, 133.
255. Id. at 133.
256. Id. at 134.
257. 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015). The Fourth Circuit previously held in Mort Ranta v.
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decision arises in the context of a Chapter 13 case, it may also
have repercussions for Chapter 11 cases. In Bullard, a Massachu-
setts bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the debtor's plan,
and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit deter-
mined that it had discretionary authority to hear the debtor's ap-
peal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)."'
The Supreme Court began by noting, "bankruptcy cases may be
immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes
within the larger case."'259 The creditor in the case argued that
"[a]n order denying confirmation is not final, so long as it leaves
the debtor free to propose another plan.,260 The Supreme Court ul-
timately agreed with the creditor, reasoning that only confirma-
tion and dismissal "fixes the rights and obligations of the par-
ties."'261 While a debtor is permitted to submit a new plan after the
denial of confirmation, the automatic stay remains in effect.262
The Court also noted that the interlocutory appeal process for re-
view of the denial of a plan remained in place; as such, appeals
could still be taken when, for example, a pure question of law was
at issue.26 Thus, in the larger scheme of things, the Bullard deci-
sion will likely change little, given the ability of courts to still
hear interlocutory appeals.
One of the most interesting, and potentially problematic, deci-
sions in this arena came from the Fourth Circuit. In Covert v.
LVNV Funding, LLC, creditor LVNV Funding, LLC ("LVNV") ac-
quired a defaulted debt against each of the separate plaintiffs in
the case.264 The separate plaintiffs each filed Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy cases and LVNV filed an unsecured proof of claim in each
of the plaintiffs' bankruptcy cases.265 After the Chapter 13 cases
had concluded, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court, al-
Gorman that an order denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is, in fact, final and ap-
pealable. 721 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, Bullard overruled the Fourth Circuit's
Mort Ranta decision.
258. Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1690-91; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
259. Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 657 n.3 (2006)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1695-96.
264. 779 F.3d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2015).
265. Id. at 244.
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leging that LVNV had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act along with other Maryland debt collection licensing laws.266
LVNV moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' state and
common law claims were barred by res judicata, as the prior con-
firmation of the debtors' Chapter 13 plans under which LVNV
had participated as an unsecured creditor based upon its filed
proofs of claims constituted a final judgment.267
The court began by outlining the elements of res judicata.268
The court proceeded to hold that confirmation of the debtors'
plans constituted a final judgment on the merits, the parties to
both proceedings were the same, and the claims "ar[ose] out of
the same transaction or series of transactions, or the same core of
operative facts."'269 Thus, the court concluded that all of the claims
were barred by res judicata.27° The appellants could have raised
their Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, but chose not to do so.271 Allowing the debtors
to raise these claims at this point would frustrate one of the fun-
damental tenants of bankruptcy, providing a final and binding
plan.272
The decision is problematic because plan confirmation in Chap-
ter 13 cases often occurs before the claims bar date. Situations
arise where a creditor files a proof of claim on the eve of (or even
after) the confirmation hearing, at which point the confirmed
plan would be res judicata to the claim, per Covert. Both the
Eastern and Western District of Virginia Bankruptcy Courts are
considering the adoption of a new local rule to address this issue
that Covert has created for Chapter 13 debtor attorneys.
There are two other Fourth Circuit decisions in this area that
warrant highlighting. First, in Morris v. Quigley (In re Quigley),
the court ruled that the projected disposable income of an above-
median Chapter 13 debtor had to include the debtor's intention to
surrender two all-terrain vehicles on which the debtor had been
266. Id. at 245.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 246 (quoting First Union Commercial Corp. v. Nelson (In re Varat Enters.,
Inc.), 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original).
269. Id. at 246-47 (quoting In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1316 (citation omitted)).
270. Id. at 247.
271. Id. at 248.
272. See id. at 248.
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making payments to the secured creditors.273 The issue the court
faced was "whether a debtor's 'projected disposable income' must
be equal to the debtor's 'disposable income' for purposes of satisfy-
ing § 1325(b)(1)(B), or whether the projected disposable income
should reflect changes that have occurred or that will occur and
that are known as of the date of plan confirmation."'274 The court
answered this question by turning to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hamilton v. Lanning. In Hamilton, the Supreme
Court held that when calculating a debtor's projected disposable
income, the court can take into consideration changes in the
debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at
confirmation.275 Applying this decision, the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that the debt at issue was significant relative to the bank-
ruptcy case "and removing that deduction would increase the
Debtor's projected disposable income by almost two-thirds.276
Next, in Pliler v. Stearns, the above-median debtor proposed a
plan with early termination language that could require him to
make monthly payments for fifty-five months, rather than sixty.
27 7
Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b)(1) provides that the court may not
approve a plan unless "the plan provides that all of the debtor's
projected disposable income to be received in the applicable com-
mitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is
due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unse-
cured creditors under the plan.27 The debtor believed that this
provision was satisfied because he did not have any projected dis-
posable income, and therefore would be devoting all projected
disposable income for the commitment period of the plan.279 The
court disagreed, reading the "applicable commitment period" lan-
guage as a strict time requirement and noting that allowing debt-
ors to terminate early like this could potentially result in wind-
falls, such as in cases where inheritances come into play.28°
273. 673 F.3d 269, 272-74 (4th Cir. 2012).
274. Id. at 272; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).
275. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 513 (2010).
276. In re Quigley, 673 F.3d at 274.
277. 747 F.3d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 2014).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).
279. Pliler, 747 F.3d at 265.
280. Id. at 264-65. Before moving past this section, two other cases warrant mention.
First, in Johnson v. Zimmer, the Fourth Circuit held that when determining the debtor's
household size, it was proper to take a fractional economic unit approach. 686 F.3d. 224,
225 (4th Cir. 2012). Second, in In re McPhee, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
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The final case dealing with confirmation issues is something of
an outlier to these prior cases. In In re Lemus, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia addressed
whether Bankruptcy Code § 1127 prevents an individual debtor
from commencing a new Chapter 13 case after substantial con-
summation of her prior Chapter 11 plan.21 The court held that
the new Chapter 13 filing did not constitute a "modification" of
the debtor's confirmed Chapter 11 plan, but rather was an entire-
ly new case.282 Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prevents a debtor
from filing a Chapter 13 after a Chapter 11, provided the subse-
quent Chapter 13 was filed in good faith .2 " The Court ultimately
found "that the Debtor has experienced a substantial and unan-
ticipated change in her financial condition and that she is pro-
ceeding in her Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case with a good faith ef-
fort to repay her creditors.284
VIII. LIEN STRIPPING
In early Summer 2015, many anticipated change to this area of
the law. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, bankruptcy law related to
stripping a totally unsecured second mortgage remains largely
the same as it has been for the last twenty-three years.8 5 The is-
sue in Caulkett was whether a Chapter 7 debtor can avoid a se-
cond lien on a piece of property when the value of property is less
than the amount of the first lien on the property.288 The Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Dewsnup v. Timm held that Chapter 7
debtors could not strip-down the value of a partially secured cred-
itor's claim to the value of the collateral securing the claim.2 7
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Caulkett, some be-
lieved that Dewsnup would be overturned. However, in Caulkett,
the Court unanimously affirmed Dewsnup and found that under
Eastern District of Virginia held that Canadian Old Age Security Benefits do not consti-
tute income, as a result of a treaty in effect between the United States and Canada that
"mandates reciprocal treatment of government retirement benefits between the two coun-
tries." No. 13-36046-KRH, 2014 WL 4211068, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2014).
281. 516 B.R. 333, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1127(e) (2012).
282. In re Lemus, 516 B.R. at 338.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 340.
285. 135 S. Ct. 1995, 2001 (2015).
286. Id. at 1998.
287. 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992).
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Bankruptcy Code § 506(d), a lien that secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an "allowed secured claim" is void. 8 Perhaps
the most important part of the opinion is the sole (unnumbered)
footnote, which reads as follows:
From its inception, Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S. Ct. 773,
116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), has been the target of criticism. See, e.g., id.,
at 420-436, 112 S. Ct. 773 (SCALIA, J., dissenting); In re Woolsey,
696 F.3d 1266, 1273-1274, 1278 (C.A.10 2012); In re Dever, 164 B.R.
132, 138, 145 (Bkrtcy. Ct. C.D. Cal. 1994); Carlson, Bifurcation of
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 12-20
(1996); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the
Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured
Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234, 2305-2307
(1997); see also Bank of America Nat. Trust and Say. Assn. v. 203
North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 463, and n.3, 119 S.
Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1999) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (collecting cases and observing that "[t]he methodological con-
fusion created by Dewsnup has enshrouded both the Courts of Ap-
peals and ... Bankruptcy Courts"). Despite this criticism, the
debtors have regeatedly insisted that they are not asking us to over-
rule Dewsnup.
Thus, while Dewsnup lives on, this footnote begs the question: for
how much longer?
The Fourth Circuit has also recently decided two lien strip cas-
es. The first is Alvarez v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. (In re Alvarez),
where the debtor filed for Chapter 13, and his wife did not join his
petition.29° The debtor sought to strip off a lien on the marital res-
idence, which was owned as tenants by the entirety.291 The court
held that the debtor could not strip off the lien because the wife's
interest in the property was not part of the bankruptcy estate.292
As filing does not sever the unity of tenants by the entirety prop-
erty under Maryland law, the only asset to become part of the
bankruptcy estate was the debtor's undivided interest in the
whole property.9
Finally, in Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), the Chapter 13
trustee challenged several confirmation orders entered by the
288. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999-2001.
289. Id. at n. t, 135 S. Ct. at 2000 n. t.
290. 733 F.3d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 2013).
291. Id. at 139-40.
292. Id. at 140-41.
293. Id.
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bankruptcy court, which stripped off junior liens against the vari-
ous debtors' residences in these "Chapter 20" cases.94 The trustee
argued that the BAPCPA established a per se rule against lien
stripping in Chapter 20 cases.299
The Fourth Circuit recognized that in light of the Bankruptcy
Code's four-year prohibition on Chapter 13 discharges for debtors
that have received a Chapter 7 discharge,296 courts have "split on
whether a debtor may strip off liens in a Chapter 20 case.2 97 The
court ultimately determined, looking to its prior decision in Bran-
igan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), which held that despite the dis-
charge bar imposed by BAPCPA, debtors can "still take ad-
vantage of the protections offered by Chapter 13 short of a
discharge. 2  Following this precedent, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the lower courts and allowed the Chapter 20 debtors to
strip off valueless junior liens against their residences.
2 99
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been uncharacteristically busy in the
past three years within the realm of bankruptcy law. However,
following the Wellness decision, the largest looming jurisdictional
questions have been resolved. It will be interesting to watch fu-
ture Supreme Court terms to see if the Court's interest in grant-
ing certiorari for bankruptcy petitions continues. While this arti-
cle has focused exclusively on case law developments, there have
also been growing comments by bankruptcy experts that the
Bankruptcy Code is in need of reform. The American Bankruptcy
Institute recently published its Final Report and Recommenda-
tions from its Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11,
which was formed in early 2012.0' That report provides a large
number of recommended changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankrupt-
294. 716 F.3d 331, 332 (4th Cir. 2013). "'Chapter 20' is a colloquial reference to a Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy filed within four years of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy that concluded with a
discharge." Id. at 332 n. 1.
295. Id. at 332.
296. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) (2012).
297. In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 336.
298. Id.; 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008).
299. In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 339.
300. AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: FINAL
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2014).
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cy Code. As the introduction to the report states, "[i]t may be that
four decades is the maximum amount of time that any financially
driven regulation can remain relevant.""1 As the Bankruptcy
Code underwent its last major revision in 1978, "the general con-
sensus among restructuring professionals is that the time has
come once again to evaluate U.S. business reorganization laws."3"2
Therefore, with the Court's recent activity level and the ever-
growing requests for legislative changes, bankruptcy law likely
will remain in a state of change. As such, the authors are hopeful
that this article will provide those who read it with a comprehen-
sive, yet concise, review of how bankruptcy case law has devel-
oped both nationally and within the Fourth Circuit so as to help
them stay informed of these developments.
301. Id. at 2 (noting that reorganization laws within the United States have historical-
ly been changed approximately every forty years: in 1898, 1938, and 1978).
302. Id.
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